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No. 101
The World Health Report 2000, prepared by the
World Health Organization, presented perfor-
mance rankings of 191 nations’ health care sys-
tems. These rankings have been widely cited in
public debates about health care, particularly by
those interested in reforming the U.S. health care
system to resemble more closely those of other
countries. Michael Moore, for instance, famously
stated in his film SiCKO that the United States
placed only 37th in the WHO report. CNN.com,
in verifying Moore’s claim, noted that France and
Canada both placed in the top 10.
Those who cite the WHO rankings typically
present them as an objective measure of the rela-
tive performance of national health care systems.
They are not. TheWHOrankings depend crucial-
ly on a number of underlying assumptions—
some of them logically incoherent, some charac-
terizedby substantial uncertainty, and some root-
ed in ideological beliefs and values that not every-
one shares.
The analysts behind the WHO rankings
express the hope that their framework “will lay
the basis for a shift from ideological discourse on
health policy to a more empirical one.” Yet the
WHOrankings themselves have a strong ideolog-
ical component. They include factors that are
arguably unrelated to actual health performance,
some of which could even improve in response to
worse health performance. Even setting those
concerns aside, the rankings are still highly sensi-
tive to both measurement error and assumptions
about the relative importanceof the components.
And finally, the WHO rankings reflect implicit
value judgments and lifestyle preferences that dif-
fer among individuals and across countries.
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Introduction
The World Health Report 2000, prepared by
theWorldHealthOrganization, presentedper-
formance rankings of 191 nations’ health care
systems.1 Those rankings have been widely
cited in public debates about health care, par-
ticularly by those interested in reforming the
U.S. health care system to resemblemore close-
ly those of other countries. Michael Moore, for
instance, famously stated in his film SiCKO
that the United States placed only 37th in the
WHO report. CNN.com, in verifying Moore’s
claim, noted that France and Canada both
placed in the top 10.2
Those who cite the WHO rankings typi-
cally present them as an objective measure of
the relative performance of national health
care systems. They are not. The WHO rank-
ings depend crucially on a number of under-
lying assumptions—some of them logically
incoherent, some characterized by substan-
tial uncertainty, and some rooted in ideolog-
ical beliefs and values that not everyone
shares. Changes in those underlying assump-
tions can radically alter the rankings.
More Than One
WHORanking
The first thing to realize about the WHO
health care ranking system is that there is
more than one. One ranking claims to mea-
sure “overall attainment” (OA) while another
claims tomeasure “overall performance” (OP).
These two indices are constructed from the
same underlying data, but the OP index is
adjusted to reflect a country’s performance
relative to how well it theoretically could have
performed (more about that adjustment
later). When using the WHO rankings, one
should specify which ranking is being used:
OA or OP.
Many popular reports, however, do not
specify the ranking used and some appear to
have drawn from both. CNN.com, for exam-
ple, reported that both Canada and France
rank in the top 10, while the United States
ranks 37th. There is no ranking for which
both claims are true. Using OP, the United
States does rank 37th. But while France is
number 1 on OP, Canada is 30. Using OA, the
United States ranks 15th, while France and
Canada rank 6th and 7th, respectively. In nei-
ther ranking is the United States at 37 while
both France and Canada are in the top 10.
Which ranking is preferable? WHO pre-
sents the OP ranking as its bottom line on
health system performance, on the grounds
thatOP represents the efficiency of each coun-
try’s health system. But for reasons to be dis-
cussed below, the OP ranking is even more
misleading than the OA ranking. This paper
focuses mainly on the OA ranking; however,
themainobjections apply to bothOPandOA.
Factors for Measuring the
Quality of Health Care
The WHO health care rankings result
from an index of health-related statistics. As
with any index, it is important to consider
how it was constructed, as the construction
affects the results. WHO’s index is based on
five factors, weighted as follows:3
1. Health Level: 25 percent
2. Health Distribution: 25 percent
3. Responsiveness: 12.5 percent
4. Responsiveness Distribution: 12.5 per-
cent
5. Financial Fairness: 25 percent
The first and third factors have reasonably
good justifications for inclusion in the index:
Health Level. This factor can most justifi-
ably be included because it is measured by a
country’s disability-adjusted life expectancy
(DALE). Of course, life expectancy can be
affected by a wide variety of factors other than
thehealth care system, such as poverty, geogra-
phy, homicide rate, typical diet, tobacco use,
and so on. Still, DALE is at least a direct mea-
sureof thehealthof a country’s residents, so its
inclusion makes sense.
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Responsiveness.This factor measures a vari-
ety of health care system features, including
speed of service, protection of privacy, choice
of doctors, and quality of amenities (e.g., clean
hospital bed linens). Although those features
may not directly contribute to longer life
expectancy, people do consider them aspects
of the quality of health care services, so there is
a strong case for including them.
The other three factors, however, are prob-
lematic:
Financial Fairness.A health system’s finan-
cial fairness (FF) is measured by determining a
household’s contribution to health expendi-
ture as a percentage of household income
(beyond subsistence), then looking at the dis-
persion of this percentage over all households.
The wider the dispersion in the percentage of
household income spent on health care, the
worse a nation will perform on the FF factor
and the overall index (other things being
equal).
In the aggregate, poor people spend a larg-
er percentage of income on health care than
do the rich.4 Insofar as health care is regarded
as a necessity, people can be expected to spend
adecreasing fractionof their incomeonhealth
care as their income increases. The same
would be true of food, except that the rich
tend to buy higher-quality food.
The FF factor is not an objective measure
of health attainment, but rather reflects a
value judgment that rich people should pay
more for health care, even if they consume
the same amount. This is a value judgment
not applied to most other goods, even those
regarded as necessities such as food and
housing. Most people understand and accept
that the poor will tend to spend a larger per-
centage of their income on these items.
More importantly, the FF factor, which
accounts for one-fourth of each nation’s OA
score, necessarily makes countries that rely on
market incentives look inferior. The FF mea-
sure rewards nations that finance health care
according to ability to pay, rather than accord-
ing to actual consumption or willingness to
pay. In most countries, a household’s tax bur-
den is proportional to income, or progressive
(i.e., taxes consume an increasing share of
income as income rises). Thus, a nation’s FF
score rises when the government shoulders
more of the health spending burden, because
more of the nation’s medical expenditures are
financed according to ability to pay. In the
extreme, if the government pays for all health
care, then the distributionof the health-spend-
ing burden is exactly the same as the distribu-
tion of the tax burden. To use the existing
WHO rankings to justify more government
involvement in health care—such as via a sin-
gle-payer health care system—is therefore to
engage in circular reasoning because the rank-
ings are designed in amanner that favors greater
government involvement. If the WHO rank-
ings are to be used to determine whether more
government involvement in health care pro-
motes better health outcomes, the FF factor
should be excluded.
The ostensible reason for including FF in
the health care performance index is to con-
sider the possibility of people landing in dire
financial straits because of their health needs.
It is debatable whether the potential for desti-
tutiondeserves inclusion in a strictmeasure of
health performance per se. But even if it does,
the FF factor does not actually measure expo-
sure to risk of impoverishment. FF is calculat-
ed by (1) finding each household’s contribu-
tion to health expenditure as a percentage of
household income (beyond subsistence), (2)
cubing the difference between that percentage
and the corresponding percentage for the
average household, and (3) taking the sum of
all such cubed differences.5 Consequently, the
FF factor penalizes a country for each house-
hold that spends a larger-than-average per-
centage of its income on health care. But it
also penalizes a country for each household
that spends a smaller-than-average percentage
of its income on health care.
Put more simply, the FF penalizes a coun-
try because some households are especially
likely to become impoverished from health
costs—but it also penalizes a country because
some households are especially unlikely to
become impoverished from health costs. In
short, the FF factor can cause a country’s
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rank to suffer because of desirable outcomes.
Health Distribution and Responsiveness
Distribution. These two factors measure in-
equality in the other factors. Health Distri-
bution measures inequality in health level6
within a country, while Responsiveness Dis-
tribution measures inequality in health re-
sponsiveness within a country.
Strictly speaking, neither of these factors
measures health care performance, because
inequality is distinct from quality of care. It is
entirely possible to have a health care system
characterized by both extensive inequality and
good care for everyone. Suppose, for instance,
that Country A has health responsiveness that
is “excellent” for most citizens but merely
“good” for some disadvantaged groups, while
Country Bhas responsiveness that is uniform-
ly “poor” for everyone. Country B would score
higher than Country A in terms of responsive-
ness distribution, despite Country A having
better responsiveness than Country B for even
its worst-off citizens. The same point applies
to the distribution of health level.
To put it anotherway, suppose that a coun-
try currently provides everyone the same quali-
ty of health care. And then suppose the quality
of health care improves for half of the popula-
tion, while remaining the same (not getting
any worse) for the other half. This should be
regarded as an unambiguous improvement:
some people become better off, and no one is
worse off. But in the WHO index, the effect is
ambiguous. An improvement in average life
expectancy would have a positive effect, while
the increase in inequalitywouldhaveanegative
effect. In principle, the net effect could go
either way.
There is good reason to account for the
quality of care received by a country’s worst-off
or poorest citizens. Yet the Health Distri-
bution and Responsiveness Distribution fac-
tors donot do that. Instead, theymeasure relative
differences in quality, without regard to the
absolute level of quality. To account for the
quality of care received by the worst-off, the
index could include a factor that measures
health among the poor, or a health care sys-
tem’s responsiveness to the poor. This would,
in essence, give greaterweight to thewell-being
of theworst off. Alternatively, a separate health
performance index could be constructed for
poor households or members of disadvan-
taged minorities. These approaches would
surely have problems of their own, but they
would at least be focused on the absolute level
of health care quality, which should be the
paramount concern.
Uncertainty and
Sensitivity Intervals
The WHO rankings are based on statistics
constructed in part from random samples. As
a result, each rankhas amarginof error.Media
reports on the rankings routinely neglect to
mention the margins of error, but the study
behind the WHO ranking7 admirably includes
an 80-percent uncertainty interval for each
country. These intervals reveal a high degree of
uncertainty associated with the ranking meth-
od.
Using the OA ranking, the U.S. rank could
range anywhere from 7 to 24. By comparison,
France could range from 3 to 11 and Canada
from 4 to 14. The considerable overlap among
these intervals, as shown in Figure 1, means
one cannot say with great confidence that the
United States does not do better in the OA
ranking than France, Canada, and most other
countries.
These intervals result only from errors
associated with random sampling. They do
not take into account differences that could
result from different weightings of the five
component factors discussed earlier. Given
that discussion, the proper weight for three
of these factors is arguably zero. The authors
of the study did not calculate rankings on the
basis of that weighting, but they did consider
other possible factor weights to arrive at a
sensitivity interval for each country’s rank.
It turns out that the U.S. rank is unusual-
ly sensitive to the choice of factor weights, as
shown in Figure 2. The U.S. rank could range
anywhere from 8 to 22, while Canada could
range from 7 to 8 and France from 6 to 7.8
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These intervals depend on the range of
weights considered and would therefore be
larger if more factor weights were considered.
Furthermore, the rank resulting from any
given factor weighting will itself have a mar-
gin of error resulting from randomsampling.
That means the two different sorts of inter-
vals (uncertainty and sensitivity) ought to be
considered jointly, resulting in even wider
ranking intervals. The ranks as reported in
the media, without corresponding intervals,
grossly overstate the precision of the WHO
study.
Achievement versus
Performance Ranking
As noted earlier, the WHO report includes
rankings based on two indices, OA and OP.
The OP index, under which the U.S. rank is
notably worse, is the WHO’s preferred mea-
sure. It is worth considering the process that
is used to convert the OA index into the OP
index.9
Thepurposeof theOA-to-OPconversion is
to measure the efficiency of health care sys-
tems—that is, their ability to get desirable
health outcomes relative to the level of expen-
diture or resources used. That is a sensible
goal. The results of the OP ranking, however,
are easily misinterpreted, or misrepresented,
as simply measuring health outcomes irrespec-
tive of inputs. For instance, according to the
WHOpress release that accompanied theorig-
inal report, “The U.S. health system spends a
higher portion of its gross domestic product
than any other country but ranks 37 out of
191 countries according to its performance,
the report finds.”10 The implication is that the
United States performs badly in the OP rank-
ing despite its high expenditures—an implica-
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Figure 1
Uncertainty Intervals of OA-Based Ranks
Source: Christopher J. L. Murray et al., “Overall Health System Achievement for 191 Countries,” Global Programme on Evidence for Health Policy
Discussion Paper Series no. 28 (Geneva: WHO, undated), p. 8.
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tion that has also been drawn by various
media outlets and commentators.11 A more
accurate statement would be that the United
States performsbadly in the ranking becauseof
its high expenditures, at least in part.
When Costa Rica ranks higher than the
United States in the OP ranking (36 versus
37), that does not mean Costa Ricans get bet-
ter health care than Americans. Americans
most likely get better health care—just not as
much better as could be expected given how
much more America spends. If the question is
health outcomes alone, without reference to
how much has been spent, the more appropri-
ate measure is the OA ranking, where the
United States is 15 and Costa Rica is 45. (Even
then, this paper’s earlier criticisms of the OA
ranking still apply.)
The conversion of OA into OP depends on
two constructed variables: first, the maximum
level of performance a country could poten-
tially achieve; and second, theminimum level of
performance the country could achieve with-
out a modern health care system. The maxi-
mum is estimated on the basis of a country’s
per capita health expenditure and its level of
literacy. The minimum is based on literacy
alone. Literacy is used as a proxy for all aspects
of a country that might affect health other
than the health care system.
Many other variables could have been
used to estimate a country’s minimum and
maximum possible performance, such as
average income, crime rate, geography, nutri-
tion, and so on. None of these were included.
But Dean Jamison and Martin Sandbu, in a
2001 Science article,12 reconstructed the OP
ranking while including just one additional
variable: geography.13 For 79 out of 96 coun-
tries for which Jamison and Sandbu were
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Figure 2
Sensitivity Intervals for OA-Based Ranks
Source: Source: Christopher J. L. Murray et al., “Overall Health SystemAchievement for 191 Countries,” Global Programme on Evidence for Health Policy
Discussion Paper Series no. 28 (Geneva: WHO, undated), p. 8.
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able to recalculate ranks,14 the resulting rank
fell outside—often far outside—the WHO
report’s 80-percent uncertainty intervals for
those ranks. In other words, inclusion of just
one additional variable could drastically
affect the resulting ranks. Inclusion of other
variables could result in even greater devia-
tions from the reported ranks. For this rea-
son, the OP ranking is even more misleading
than the OA ranking, which simply reports
health outcomes without a spurious “effi-
ciency” adjustment.
Underlying Paternalistic
Assumptions
The WHO rankings, by purporting to
measure the efficacy of health care systems,
implicitly take all differences in health out-
comes not explained by spending or literacy
and attribute them entirely to health care sys-
tem performance. Nothing else, from tobac-
co use to nutrition to sheer luck, is taken into
account.
To some extent, the exclusion of other
variables is simply the result of inadequacies
in the data. It is difficult to get information
on all relevant factors, and even more diffi-
cult to account for their expected effects on
health. But some factors are deliberately
excluded by the WHO analysis on the basis of
paternalistic assumptions about the proper
role of health systems. An earlier paper laying
out the WHO methodological framework
asserts, “Problems such as tobacco consump-
tion, diet, and unsafe sexual activity must be
included in an assessment of health system
performance.”15
In other words, the WHO approach holds
health systems responsible not just for treat-
ing lung cancer, but for preventing smoking
in the first place; not just for treating heart
disease, but for getting people to exercise and
lay off the fatty foods.
That approach is problematic for two pri-
mary reasons. First, it does not adequately
account for factors that are simply beyond
the control of a health system. If the culture
has a predilection for unhealthy foods, there
may be little health care providers can do
about it. Conversely, if the culture has a pre-
existing preference for healthy foods, the
health care system hardly deserves the credit.
(Notice the high rank of Japan, known for its
healthy national diet.) And it hardly makes
sense to hold the health system accountable
for the homicide rate. Is it reasonable to con-
sider the police force a branch of the health
system?
Second, the WHO approach fails to con-
sider people’s willingness to trade off health
against other values. Some people are happy
to give up a few potential months or even
years of life in exchange for the pleasures of
smoking, eating, having sex, playing sports,
and so on. The WHO approach, rather than
taking the public’s preferences as given,
deems some preferences better than others
(and thenpraises or blames the health system
for them).
A superior (though still imperfect) ap-
proach would take people’s health-related
behavior as given, and then ask which health
systems do the best job of dealing with what-
ever health conditions arise. We could ask, for
instance, which systems do the best job of
treating cancer or heart disease patients. We
could then rank nations according to disease-
specific mortality rates or five-year survival
rates. These approaches present challenges as
well, as it can be difficult to control for all con-
founding factors. For example, better five-year
survival rates may reflect earlier detection
rather than better treatment or outcomes.
Still, if the goal is to assess the efficacyof coun-
tries’ health care systems, it makes more sense
to lookat condition-specific success rates than
indices (like the OA and OP) that fail to con-
trol for non–health-care factors like nutrition
and lifestyle.
Conclusion
The analysts behind the WHO rankings
express the hope that their framework “will
lay the basis for a shift from ideological dis-
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course on health policy to a more empirical
one.”16 Yet the WHO rankings themselves
have a strong ideological component. They
include factors that are arguably unrelated to
actual health performance and some that
could even improve in response to worse
health performance. Even setting those con-
cerns aside, the rankings are still highly sen-
sitive to both measurement error and
assumptions about the relative importance
of the components. And finally, the WHO
rankings reflect implicit value judgments
and lifestyle preferences that differ among
individuals and across countries. The WHO
health care ranking system does not escape
ideology. On the contrary, it advances ideo-
logical assumptions under the guise of objec-
tivity. Those interested in objective measures
of health system performance should look
elsewhere.
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